The Alien Meets Some Constitutional
Hurdles in Employment, Education
and Aid Programs

ELWIN GRIFFITH*

Aliens have encountered legal obstacles in attempting to take
advantage ofsome of the opportunitiesavailable to United States
citizens. As a result courts have had to examine some constitutional issues raised within this context. In this article,the author
examines the major decisions affecting aliens in several areas
and finds some inconsistency. The author suggests that the
Supreme Court is beginning to take a harder look at the role of
aliens in the political community and is restrictingto citizens the
functions of representativegovernment.
INTRODUCTION

The United States is a land of immigrants. Every year
thousands of aliens enter this country to begin a new life as permanent residents.' However, the transition has frequently been
difficult. Some early governmental restrictions proved burdensome to aliens.2 The restrictions in the area of employment were
in some respects a product of fear and anxiety about rising unem* Dean, DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Long Island University,
1960; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1963; LL.M., New York University, 1964.
1. Between 1961 and 1970, 3,321,677 immigrants were admitted. [1977] INS
ANN. REP. 33. The immigration law imposes no restrictions on such aliens who
seek employment. A nonimmigrant cannot work unless he has been granted permission by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or he is in a classification
that authorizes employment. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e) (1980).
2. See, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (pool hall operation forbidden); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (public works employment forbidden); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (statute made it unlawful for
alien to have rifle).
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ployment among citizens. But there was also a feeling that citizens should somehow have first claim on public resources. Aliens
had to be rather patient, therefore, until their acquisition of citizenship could qualify them for full participation in the labor market.
The restrictions in public employment were supported in part
by the theory that citizen employees were more familiar with the
institutions of government and that, therefore, citizenship was a
logical requirement for public service. 3 Furthermore, it was argued not only that the state's resources should be retained for the
use of citizens, but also that public employment should be similarly restricted because it was a privilege, rather than a right, to
work for the state.4 But even in private employment, there were
some reservations about the ability of aliens to become assimilated into the customs and traditions of this country.5 Those reservations extended even to basic queries about the loyalty of
aliens. Thus, in a very real sense the employment rights of aliens
became enmeshed in a variety of controversial issues.
It was quite fashionable for the state to justify its discriminatory actions by asserting a proprietary interest in its own resources 6 or in its public service positions. 7 After all, it believed
itself obligated to exercise its discretion in favor of citizens and to
exclude others who were considered strangers in the community.
Furthermore, the state exercised its police power to protect its
citizens from allegedly unqualified aliens who wanted to dabble in
certain activities that required strict governmental regulation.8
There were restrictions in other areas. States occasionally rejected aliens' applications for loans, scholarships 9 and welfare
benefits'O because of a belief that the limited resources of the government budget should be reserved for citizens or, in certain
cases, for those aliens who either had fulfilled certain residency
3. See C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), afrd sub nom. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977). See
also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735
(D. Ariz. 1972), af'd, 413 U.S. 902 (1973).
4. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
5. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
6. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876).
7. Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
8. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (pool hall ownership); Trageser v.
Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905 (1890) (liquor license); Morin v. Nunan, 91 N.J.L 506, 103
A. 378 (1918) (chauffeur's license); Miller v. Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div. 798, 202
N.Y.S. 549 (1924) (soft drink trade).
9. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577
(3d Cir. 1972).
10. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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requirements" or had declared an intention to become citizens.'
As time went on, states eventually found it difficult to defend the
validity of these restrictions. Courts began to look more closely at
alienage classifications.13 For a while it looked as if the pendulum
had swung in favor of aliens.14 However, recent judicial decisions
have dealt aliens some setbacks.15
In light of these developments, this article will review how
courts have struck the balance between governmental interests
and aliens' rights. A discussion of the most recent judicial pronouncements in these areas will reveal the distinctions that have
been made in cases dealing with alienage discrimination.
ALIENS AND EMPLOYMENT

Although the Supreme Court held in Yick Wo v. Hopkins16 that
aliens were entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amendment, that did not result in an immediate solution to the
problems of discrimination against aliens. Courts continued to
recognize the efficacy of the special public interest doctrine which
permitted states to preserve their resources for their own citizens.
Thus, in Crane v. New York,17 the Supreme Court sanctioned a
statute which forbade the employment of aliens on public works
projects. The Court sustained other statutes that prevented
11. In Graham the Arizona statute conditioned eligibility for benefits on the
alien's 15 year residence in the state. Id. at 367.
12. In Nyquist v. Mauclet, the New York statute required the alien to declare
his intent to file for citizenship as soon as he was eligible. After the aliens had
filed their complaints, the statute was amended to allow refugees paroled into the
United States to qualify for tuition assistance awards without even declaring an
intent to become citizens. That amendment weakened the state's argument about
the importance of citizenship or of the intent to assume citizenship. 432 U.S. 1, 3-4
& n.4 (1977).
13. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
"classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 372. See also Purdy
& Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
14. See C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (public contractors), affid sub nom. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429
U.S. 1031 (1977); Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 556 F.2d
560 (2d Cir. 1976) (doctors), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978); Miranda v. Nelson, 351
F. Supp. 735 (D. Ariz. 1972), afJ'd, 413 U.S. 902 (1973) (civil service); In re Parks,
484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971) (lawyers).
15. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291 (1978).
16. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17. 239 U.S. 195 (1915).

aliens from owning land'8 or exploiting a state's natural resources. 1 9

Very soon, though, the Supreme Court recognized that a state's
interest in preserving its resources or in protecting the health and
welfare of its citizenry did not justify much of the unfavorable
treatment of aliens. In Truax v. Raich,20 the Court invalidated an
Arizona statute that required an employer having five or more
persons on his staff to employ not less than eighty percent nativeborn Americans or qualified voters. 2 1 The Court recognized that
the federal government had exclusive control over immigration
and naturalization and emphasized that it would be impermissible to restrict the access of aliens to common occupations in the
community.2 2 Otherwise, states could effectively deny aliens the
right to settle in the place of their choice even after the federal
government had granted them the privilege of immigrating to the
United States. 23 Although the Court found that the Arizona statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it recognized the state's power to make reasonable
24
classifications that affect the distribution of the state's resources
or promote the health and welfare of residents in the community.25 It was evident, therefore, that statutes would be sustained
if there was some rational basis for their enactment. This rational
basis approach clearly highlighted the challenge that awaited
those who wanted to question the constitutionality of these classifications.
As time went on, the special public interest doctrine began to
wane. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,26 the Supreme
Court denounced a state statute that prevented aliens from fishing in the water off the shores of California.2 7 The statute in question provided that anyone who was ineligible for citizenship
would be unable to obtain a fishing license. The Court held that
no special public interest justified the exclusion of any or all
aliens from fishing in California's coastal waters. 28 The Court
18. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923).
19. patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876).
20. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 42.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 41. See Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to
Work, 57 CoLTum. L. REV. 1012 (1957).
26. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
27. Id. at 415-16.
28. Id. at 421.
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hinted that closer scrutiny might be appropriate in certain circumstances because "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow
limits.

'29

Until then, the Court had been content to restrict itself

to rational basis language and had given no indication that a
state's power to discriminate against aliens was narrowly limited.
It was the first sign that the traditional equal protection test articulated by the Court as recently as Clarke v. Deckebach was on
its decline.30 In a sense, the Court began to take a harder look at
these alienage classifications.
The real shift came in Graham v. Richardson,31 when the plaintiffs challenged statutes that permitted states to discriminate
against aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits. Once again
the Court had to determine the level of review it wished to follow
in dealing with statutory discrimination against aliens. If the stat3
ute dealt with a suspect classification 32 or a fundamental right, 3
then the Court would apply strict judicial scrutiny in determining
the statute's constitutionality. Such an approach would ensure
the statute's survival only if it was necessary to accomplish an
overriding state interest.3 4 In the absence of a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the Court would sustain the statute if
35
it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective.
The Court in Graham examined the status of aliens in American
29. Id. at 420.
30. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), upheld a statute that forbade the
issuance to an alien of a license to operate a pool hall.
31. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin). A suspect classification normally will involve a "discrete and insular" minority excluded from the political process and having an immutable or
involuntary characteristic. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUroNAL LAW 1052-54
(1978); Karst, The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(right to travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (first amendment rights).
34. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The state interest required
to justify the statute has also been characterized as "substantial," In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973), or "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971).
35. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). The rational basis test carries with it a strong presumption

about a statute's constitutionality. An intermediate level of review, lying somewhere between minimal review and strict review, has sometimes been used. See,
e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);

society and confirmed that they were "a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority" 36 and that, therefore, classifications
based on alienage should be characterized as suspect and subject
to strict judicial scrutiny.3 7 The Court then decided that the statutes in question had failed to meet the appropriate test, inasmuch
as they did not further a compelling state interest. 38 The equal
protection 3 9 challenge had wrought a change in the Court's approach to classifications based on alienage. It would no longer be
sufficient for such classifications to have merely a reasonable basis.

The Court took another opportunity to deal with a challenge to
alienage discrimination in Sugarman v. Dougall.4 0 It was asked
to pass on a statute that prohibited the employment of aliens in
the New York civil service. 41 In applying the strict scrutiny test,
the Court found that the New York statute offended the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.42 The statute
swept too broadly because it affected lower-level as well as policymaking positions and, therefore, it did not meet the test of precision that was a peculiar ingredient of strict scrutiny.43 The Court
also took this opportunity to discredit the special public interest
doctrine,4 4 which had already been looked upon with disfavor in
Grahamv. Richardon.4 5 The Court saw no reason to resurrect it
in an employment case.4 6 Furthermore, the concept that constitutional rights could turn on the classification of a governmental
benefit as a right, rather than a privilege, was once again reWeinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972).
36. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id. at 374-75.

39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
41. The statute provided: "Except as herein otherwise provided, no person
shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless
he is a citizen of the United States." N.Y. Cry. SERV. LAw § 53(1) (McKinney 1973).
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. X=v, § 1.

43. 413 U.S. at 643.
44. One expression of this doctrine can be fohnd in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,

39-40 (1915), where the Court found that the statute there did not fit within the
doctrine:
The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or

distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources
of the people of the state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its
citizens as against both aliens and the citizens of other states.

See also Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).

45. 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
46. 413 U.S. at 645.
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jected.4 7
In Sugarman, the statute in question imposed a blanket prohibition against the employment of aliens. The statute did not require citizenship as a qualification for specific positions in the
civil service. 48 This would have evoked a different judicial response. There was no doubt that the statute was overbroad and
imprecise. The Court acknowledged that the state had the power
to define its own political community and to restrict to its citizens
those important executive, legislative and judicial positions that
required direct formulation, execution and review of broad public
policy. 49 The Court conceded that there could be occasions when
the rational basis test would apply to classifications based on
alienage. It was evident that there would be no .automatic stringency in every case. The Court's scrutiny would not be so searching when it dealt with questions falling within the state's
constitutional prerogatives. 50 Those prerogatives included the
5
state's right to decide on a person's eligibility for voting, ' political office, 52 and jury service.5 3 Thus, although the Court con-

firmed alienage as a suspect classification, it explained that the
"political community" exception 54 would give rise to less demanding scrutiny.
The Court in Sugarman reiterated the basic requirement of
strict scrutiny: a state must demonstrate a substantial interest if
alienage discrimination is to be sustained.SS Furthermore, the
statutory classification used must be necessary for the accomplishment of that interest. On the other hand, minimal judicial
scrutiny calls for only some rational basis on which the statute
can be related to a legitimate state objective. Because strict scru47. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See also Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
48. 413 U.S. at 639.
49. Id. at 647.
50. Id. at 648; Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
51. See Skafte v. Rorex, 191 Colo. 399, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed,
430 U.S. 961 (1977).
52. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
53. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), affid., 426 U.S. 913
(1976).
54. The Court said in Sugarman: "A restriction on the employment of noncitizens, narrowly confined, could have particular relevance to this important state
responsibility, for alienage itself is a fact that reasonably could be employed in defining 'political community'." 413 U.S. at 649.
55. Id. at 642.

tiny is not required in every case of alienage discrimination, the
difficulty lies in identifying those situations in which less scrutiny
is in order because the state is either exercising its constitutional
prerogatives or defining its political community.
The difficulty in identifying such cases was certainly apparent
in another case decided on the same day as Sugarman. In In re
Griffiths,56 the Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut rule
that prevented aliens from practicing law. The state emphasized
that attorneys were entrusted with heavy responsibilities and
were in fact officers of the court, having the authority to sign writs
and administer oaths. 5 7 The state suggested that aliens should
not have the power to engage in such activities because that
would be an exercise of citizenship. 58 However, the Court did not
view the attorney's role as governmental in nature 59 and, therefore, it did not think that this case should be included within the
"political community" exception discussed in Sugarman. Thus,
although the Court recognized the importance of the lawyer's
function within the community, 60 it applied strict judicial scrutiny
to invalidate the Connecticut rule because less scrutiny would
have been appropriate only if lawyers could be regarded as part
of the governmental or policy-making framework.
Even after Sugarman and Griffths, other attempts were made
to restrict aliens in their employment endeavors. In Examining
Board of Engineersv. Floresde Otero,61 Puerto Rico attempted to
ban aliens from private engineering practice. Among the reasons
advanced for the ban was Puerto Rico's interest in preventing an
influx of Spanish-speaking engineers. 62 This justification had lost
its appeal after Takahashiand Graham. The statute curtailed the
employment opportunities of lawful resident aliens who were in
Puerto Rico pursuant to federal immigration laws. 63 That curtail-

ment could not be tolerated in view of the exclusive responsibility
of the federal government for immigration.
56. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
57. Id. at 723-24.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 729.
60. The Court recognized the importance of the lawyer's functions:
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and in-

fluence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout
the history of our country. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Id.
61. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
62. Id. at 605.
63. Id. In DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that forbade employers from employing illegal aliens.
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Other justifications were advanced to support the restriction
against alien engineers. The desire to raise the standard of living
of Puerto Ricans and to assure the financial responsibility of alien
engineers could not survive searching scrutiny.64 In effect, the
statute commanded private contractors to employ only American
citizens. That mandate could not survive because it was based on
economic motives that had been rejected long ago as a basis for
alienage discrimination. 65 It was also clear that there was not
even a rational relationship between Puerto Rico's desire to assure the financial responsibility of engineers and its total ban on
alien practitioners. If there was a concern about an engineer's
ability to remain answerable for his professional negligence, that
concern could be reflected by a narrow statutory approach. Moreover, there was no evidence that aliens would be any more disposed than citizens to engage in shoddy work. Thus, it was not
necessary to isolate alien engineers by imposing such a sweeping
restriction against them. Like so many other statutes designed to
restrict aliens, this one went beyond the objectives enumerated
by its supporters. A less painful way of assuring the financial responsibility of engineers could be obtained with statutory precision. Although the Court indicated that an application of even the
rational basis test would have invalidated the statute, it found the
66
statute unconstitutional by applying strict scrutiny.
Just as one was becoming accustomed to the strict scrutiny approach in alienage discrimination cases, the Supreme Court
decided Foley v. Connelie.6 7 In that case, a New York statute 68 requiring state policemen to be citizens of the United States withstood a constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Because the Court regarded the
64. 426 U.S. at 605. In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the attempt to require
the employment of only American citizens did not survive.
65. 426 U.S. at 605-06. The economic justification could be used to ban aliens
from nearly all lawful employment
66. The Court did not decide whether the fifth amendment or the fourteenth
amendment applied to the Puerto Rico statute. The Court found that the statute
was unconstitutional under either amendment once it was examined under strict
scrutiny. Id. at 601-02. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, took the view that the equal
protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not apply to Puerto Rico. Id. at 606-09.
67. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
68. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979) provides in part: "No person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States ...
." The challenge was based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment

police function as one of the basic functions of government, it
found that the citizenship requirement bore a rational relationship to the unique demands of the position and that the alien's
equal protection rights were not violated.69
It is important to ask whether the police functions performed
by state troopers place them within the narrow exception discussed in Sugarman.70 In one sense every state employee is involved to some extent in the execution of public policy.7 1 Yet
Sugarman prohibited the blanket exclusion of aliens from all
state positions. That would suggest that the Court perceived differences among the various civil service functions. In the same
vein, it may be suggested that the various ranks of the constabulary perform different functions. The slightest participation in the
execution of public policy should not sanction the requirement of
citizenship. It is submitted that the participation should be direct
and not merely contributory.
Even more troubling was the Court's view in Foley that it
would be anomalous to conclude that citizens should be subjected
to the discretionary powers of alien policemen in light of past
holdings that judges and jurors must be citizens.72 As Justice
Marshall noted in his dissent,73 New York State had already
granted to any person the power of arrest in certain circumstances. 74 It was anomalous, therefore, that private persons,
aliens and citizens alike, had the power to arrest, but the state police force was restricted to citizens.
It is clear that Sugarman did not intend to impose the citizenship requirement on all state employees and, therefore, one
should be especially careful that the Sugarman exception dealing
69. 435 U.S. at 300. In Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal.
1977), a district court rejected a statute that required peace officers to be citizens.
The judgment was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Foley.
Los Angeles County v. Chavez-Salido, 436 U.S. 901 (1978). On remand the district
court found the statute in violation of the equal protection clause. 49 U.S.L.W. 2006
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
70. That exception recognizes that citizenship may be an acceptable requirement for "officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review
of broad public policy." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
71. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 303-04 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 299.
73. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. N.Y. CrmI. Pnoc. LAw § 140.30 (McKinney 1971) provides that:

1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, any person may arrest another person (a) for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such
felony, and (b) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed such
offense in his presence.
2. Such an arrest, if for a felony, may be made anywhere in the state. If
the arrest is for an offense other than a felony, it may be made only in the
county in which such offense was committed.
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with the execution of public policy be read in context; if not, the
exception "would swallow the rule.17 5 To misinterpret that exception is to ascribe to all state employees the same privilege of executing broad public policy. This is not to suggest that such
positions are not important in the ordinary scheme of things. But
the line between policy-making positions and other positions
must be drawn as consistently and intelligibly as possible.76
The Court in Foley did not think it surprising that most states
required their police officers to be citizens.7 7 The fact is that most
of those state statutes 78 were enacted before the Sugarman decision and thus the Court should not have relied on them to bolster
its own position on the requirement of citizenship. 79 But the
Court further observed that such state statutes might require police officers to be citizens because of the presumption of a citizen's familiarity and sympathy with American traditions.80 That
point had been raised with little success on other occasions.8 1 Familiarity with American traditions should be important only if it
is an essential ingredient of the function to be performed. The
concept of familiarity with American traditions should not have
been used to sustain the citizenship requirement for the state
trooper's position. That permitted a diversion from the basic
question whether policemen are involved in the execution of
broad public policy. Some citizens are themselves more familiar
and sympathetic to such traditions than are other citizens. Thus,
even among citizens themselves, there are degrees of knowledge
about American institutions. Surely an alien applicant for the police force who has lived most of his life in the United States may
be more familiar with American traditions than a natural-born citizen who has lived overseas for a long time. In view of this, the
question should be asked again in the words of Justice Stevens:
"What is the group characteristic that justifies the unfavorable
treatment of an otherwise qualified individual simply because he
75.
76.
77.
78.

Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 304 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 299.
See, e.g., Awx. STAT. ANN. § 42-406 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 78-1 (1976); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.040(2) (c) (1971); MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 28.4 (1967); Mis. CODE
ANN. § 45-3-9 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1193 (Purdon 1962).
79. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 312 n.5 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 299-300 & n.9.
81. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 733 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also
Faruld v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972).

is an alien?" 82

Although the majority in Foley did not discuss the question,
Justice Stevens in his dissent raised the possibility that the disqualifying characteristic was the alien's allegiance to a foreign
power, which might bring the alien's loyalty into question. 83 Perhaps Justice Stevens' observation was related to the statement of
the Court that American citizens would be more familiar with the
traditions of this country. 8 4 The loyalty question was discussed in
Griffiths8 5 and was not accepted as a basis for denying an alien
the right of admission to the Bar. Justice Stevens noted in Fo1ey 86 that the disloyalty of aliens as a class could be accepted
only if the Court was willing to repudiate its decision in Griffiths.
If the Court wanted to question the loyalty of aliens, the Griffiths
case had provided an appropriate opportunity. The outcome
there did not lend credibility to the theory of alien disloyalty.
Surely Foley did not provide any more fertile ground for the propagation of that concept. However, the Court in Foley had a lurking suspicion that an alien policeman might be unable to
understand the basic tenets of our democracy and that his sympathy and understanding could best be exemplified by a formal dec87
laration of support for the institutions of government.
It is remarkable that the Court in Griffiths did not think that
only citizens could take an oath in support of the Constitution,88
but then in Foley it seemed to rely on citizenship as an element
of loyalty.8 9 It should be observed that the question of loyalty
might have been more relevant in Grffiths, where the alien was
indeed eligible to apply for citizenship and had steadfastly declined to do so.90 The question might then be asked whether the
alien in Grffiths was unwilling to swear allegiance to her country
of residence. But even if the alien had conceded that unwillingness, it should not necessarily have reflected unfavorably on her
loyalty to the United States. It is difficult to understand how the
Court in Foley could even raise the question of the alien's loyalty
without dealing with its previous disposition in Grfilths. In any
82. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 308 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 299-300.
85. 413 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1973).
86. 435 U.S. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 299-300.
88. 413 U.S. at 725-26.
89. 435 U.S. at 300 & n.9.
90. The alien was eligible to apply for naturalization because she was married
to a citizen of the United States and had fulfilled the three-year residency require-

ment. 413 U.S. at 718 n.1. Generally, the residency requirement prior to application for naturalization is five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976).
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event, it is problematic whether a state should exclude all aliens
from the job market on this basis. The loyalty determination can
be made on an individual basis and should not lead to the wholesale exclusion of aliens. In some respects the issue of loyalty represents a diversion from the main question at hand, and on
previous occasions the Court did not allow itself the luxury of
that diversion.9 ' Perhaps it is because of the peculiar definition of
the policeman's function that the loyalty question would be relevant. The Foley Court certainly thought s0.92 But there was no
evidence to suggest that aliens could be discredited on that basis.
It was thought that aliens should be excluded from the state police force in the same way that they are excluded from voting and
from juries. The considerations that apply to voting93 or jury service 94 do not necessarily apply to the area of employment. Citizens
should participate in the definition of their own political community, and the state should regard it as within its constitutonal prerogatives to restrict these rights accordingly. 95 But that is a far
cry from the ordinary police function of enforcing laws in particular situations.9 6 The designation of the police function as "ordinary" by no means underestimates its importance. As a matter of
fact, it is true that enforcement of the law frequently requires the
exercise of discretion and good judgment. But no one has suggested that citizens are able to exercise any better discretion and
judgment than aliens who are residents of the community. If the
importance of the police function may be measured by its impact
on society in order to justify the restriction to citizens, then the
same argument can be made for other workers whose functions
91. The Court noted in Griffiths that the alien:
has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of
both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given case that an applicant is not one who
"swears to an oath proforma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath."
413 U.S. at 726 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court found no difficulty with
an alien taking both the attorney's oath and the commissioner's oath.
92. The Court referred to the policeman's authority to enter a dwelling, to stop
vehicles, and to arrest people. 435 U.S. at 297-98.
93. See, e.g., Skafte v. Rorex, 191 Colo. 399, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
94. See, e.g., Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), affd, 426 U.S. 913

(1976).
95. Sugarman v. Dougali, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 344 (1972), the Court pointed out that a state may take necessary steps
"to preserve the basic conception of a political community."
96. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 304-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

affect the basic framework of society. Would this not open the
floodgates once again to alienage restrictions which have little to
do with the functions to be performed? One cannot tell whether
the Court in Foley was led astray by the power of policemen to
make arrests and searches in the execution of their duties. While
those powers are not to be regarded lightly, they do not convert
the policeman into a high-ranking official who formulates or executes broad public policy.
In Foley, the Court restated the position it had taken in
Sugarman: that its scrutiny would not be so demanding when it
was dealing with matters within a state's constitutional prerogatives. 97 One of the constitutional prerogatives was the state's

power to describe citizenship qualifications for those persons
holding important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions. 9 8 The Court went on to say that it has never upheld an
alien's constitutional right to hold "high public office" under the
fourteenth amendment. 99 Perhaps the reference to "important
non-elective executive positions" might be equated with the "high
public office" referred to in the same opinion.OO The Court was
by no means discussing the state's power to prescribe citizenship
qualifications for all state positions, regardless of their importance or policy-making power. If it is admitted that the state's
power to exclude aliens relates only to important positions involving broad, public policy functions, then the Court's reliance in Foley on the Sugarman dictum is all the more perplexing. The
Court had upheld the narrowness of the Sugarman exception in
refusing to apply the exception in Griffiths, while conceding that
lawyers played a vital and significant role in society. The Court
forsook its narrow approach after Foley. It seems that the exception will suffer a further expansion. In an attempt to stem the
tide, the Court will find itself including more and more functions
within the exception. Thereafter, the exception may cease to
have the force of an exception.
It may be that the nature of the inquiry should be adjusted to
suit the type of position that is subject to restriction. The
Sugarman concept of demanding less judicial scrutiny in some
cases' 0 1 led the Court in Foley to apply minimal scrutiny. However, should not cases like Sugarman be regarded in fact as highlighting the circumstances under which it would further the
97. Id. at 296.
98. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
99. Id. at 648-49.
100. Id. at 647-49.
101. The Court applies a less stringent test to matters within a state's constitutional prerogatives. Id. at 648.
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state's compelling interest to exclude aliens from certain positions?102 That is somewhat different from suggesting when less
scrutiny should be tolerated. The approach that suggests the
existence of a compelling interest would obviate the difficulty associated with the application of minimal scrutiny. At least there
would not be such a dramatic deviation from the principles underlying suspect classifications.
Furthermore, it would seem that the Court in Foley did not deal
with the problem of the statute's overbreadth. Although dealing
with a state's constitutional powers in Sugarman,the Court acknowledged that in the quest to achieve a substantial purpose,
the state must employ means which are "precisely drawn in light
of the acknowledged purpose."103 This was confirmed in Griffiths,
where the Court found that lawyers could be tested individually
to determine competence. 0 4 Thus, the appropriate query is
whether that system of individual examination could be applied
successfully to the police force. Is it not possible that the Court's
earlier concern for avoiding wholesale exclusion of aliens from
certain jobs has now given way to a concern for the alien's proximity to the law enforcement arm of government? It is submitted
that the Court's inclusion of police officers in the basic conception
of the political community is a dramatic and unjustifiable expansion of the Sugarman idea.105 The police function is an occupation and thus comes closer to civil service than to governing. It
would be more palatable, therefore, to maintain strict scrutiny of
alienage classifications in such cases than to accept minimal scrutiny on the basis of an expanded, political community doctrine.
The Sugarman doctrine sanctioned a citizenship requirement
for persons holding "elective or important non-elective executive,
1 6
legislative, and judicial positions."
o The use of that language indicates that the Court regarded all elective positions to be at the
heart of representative government. But it was necessary for
nonelective positions to be designated as "important" in order to
come within the citizenship requirement espoused by the Court.
102. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 303 n.1 (Marshall J., dissenting). See also J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592-93 (1978);

Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the EqualProtectionClause, and the Three Faces of
ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. I. REV. 945, 979 n.171 (1975).
103. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643.
104. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 725-27.
105. See IL TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrnONAL LAW 97 (Supp. 1979).
106. 413 U.S. at 647.

Therefore, the basic question really revolves around the importance of a particular position in the scheme of things and the responsibility for the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy. It may be that the Court in Sugarman used the
term "important" to refer to high-ranking positions. In that event,
the Foley Court did not pick up the lead because not all policemen are in such positions. There was a perceived shift in Foley
from the concept of rank to the impact' 0 7 of the particular function. It is much more meaningful, however, to make a distinction
on the basis of the authority and the policy-making function of
the particular position, rather than on the basis of its impact.
However, such impact may, indeed, be a relevant consideration in
determining whether a particular position is of high rank. Pursuant to this approach, it is easy to see the distinction between a superintendent of the state police and a state policeman in the
ranks over whom the superintendent exercises control. By denying aliens access to the ranks of the state police, the Court in Foley impliedly adopted the views of Justice Rehnquist in
Sugarman:1o8 that policy-making functions have permeated the
entire administrative scheme of the civil service and that, therefore, there is really no difference in authority between the toplevel administrators and employees in the ranks. Justice Rehnquist's views on this attracted no supporters among the other justices, for the Court in Sugarman obviously felt that there was a
difference between those employees who "apply facts to individual cases" and those "who write the laws or regulations." However, Justice Rehnquist's observations accentuated the dilemma
which the Court in Sugarman caused by introducing an inadequate standard. It is not always clear when the alien is participating in government. In this respect the articulated guidelines of
the Court require more refinement before it can truly be said that
the government's legitimate interests have been vindicated.
If Foley is to be understood, it must be regarded as accepting a
state restriction on alien employment because of the uniqueness
of the police function. The Foley Court was more impressed with
107. The Foley Court said: "Clearly the exercise of police authority calls for a
very high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can
have serious impact on individuals." 435 U.S. at 298 (footnote omitted). This is not
the same thing as saying that the proper discharge of duties will have a serious
impact. Most abuses of power can have this effect but that should not necessarily
suggest a stronger case for minimal scrutiny.
108. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist made an interesting observation when he said that "as far as the private individual who must seek approval or services is concerned, many of these
'low level' civil servants are in fact policymakers." Id.
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the impact of the policeman's action on individual liberty' 0 9 than
the policeman's position in the state hierarchy. Because the execution of the police function could result in a deprivation of liberty for some members of society, the Court was convinced that
such a function should be restricted to citizens, as they are a part
of the political community. The Court viewed it as a question of
the right of citizens to be governed by citizens. However, it must
be suggested here that aliens should not be excluded from law
enforcement simply because their participation would affect citizen members of the political community. Because policemen are
not involved in the execution of broad public policy, aliens should
have the right to enforce the law even though they have not yet
become members of the political community through the assumption of American citizenship.
If there was any doubt about the Court's position in Foley, it
was removed by the decision in Ambach v. Norwick.11o In that
case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute
requiring public school teachers to be citizens of the United
States. The Court made it quite clear that the rational basis test
was applicable in Norwick just as in Foley, because public school
teaching was a governmental function that invoked an exception
to the general rule applicable to alienage classifications."' If the
general rule were applied, the statutory classification would be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
The Court's division on the issues revealed the difficulty of
fitting the Norwick case into the exception. A bare majority
viewed the functions of the teacher as essential to the "preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests. .. ,"112 Thus, an
underlying theme of the decision was the Court's appreciation of
the influence that teachers have on students' attitudes towards
government and the political process." 3 As a result, the Court believed that the opportunity to teach at the public school level
should be restricted to citizens or intending citizens.
An appropriate query is why there are certain legislative exceptions permitting aliens to teach in the public schools if this is in109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

435 U.S. at 298.
441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78.

deed a basic governmental function. Allowing an alien to teach
when he cannot obtain an immigrant visa because of an oversubscribed quota1 4 militates against the importance of the citizenship requirement in the first place. The state's willingness to
ignore the lack of citizenship in such an instance points up the
weakness of the state's assertions that citizens alone can discharge the fundamental obligation of educating public school students. The situation becomes even more delicate when it is
recognized that an alien who lacks an immigrant visa because of
an oversubscribed quota cannot be regarded as a lawful permanent resident."15 The equities are not, therefore, on his side when
he is compared with an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Furthermore, a state's willingness to grant a waiver of
the citizenship requirement in certain cases again defeats the
contention that teachers are exercising some governmental power
which gives rise to the exception first articulated in Sugarman.
Interestingly enough, the statute in Norwick recognizes that some
alien teachers may indeed possess talents that are not readily
available among citizen teachers. In such instances, the citizenship requirement is waived by the appropriate city regulation.
This concession raises basic doubts about the relevance of citizenship in public school assignments.
The Court's decisions in Foley and Norwick herald a retreat
from the strict scrutiny used in other cases. It appears that the
Court has taken a rather broad approach to the "political community" doctrine. This represents a contrast to the narrow approach
taken in Griffiths, where the Court stated that a lawyer's important functions do not put him close enough to the political process
to make him a "formulator of government policy."116 It would
seem that the Court looked for a convenient place to draw the
line because it feared a gradual obliteration of the distinction between aliens and citizens." 7 But that concern has produced new
114. An alien may be unable to obtain an immigrant visa because the quota for
the area or country has been oversubscribed. For those subject to the quota, the
maximum number of visas available worldwide for each fiscal year is 270,000. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203, 94 Stat. 106. If an alien is an "immediate
relative" of a United States citizen, he is exempt from the numerical limitations.
An immediate relative is a child, spouse, or parent of a citizen, but in the case of
parents seeking a visa, the citizen child must be at least 21 years old. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (1976).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (20) (1976) provides: "The term 'lawfully admitted for
permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance
with the immigration laws, such status not having changed."
116. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729 (footnote omitted).
117. In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), Chief Justice Burger took the dissenting view that strict scrutiny was not required in every case of alienage discrimination because that would "obliterate all the distinctions between citizens
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results that do not account satisfactorily for the old. If the Court
has consciously taken a new turn in assessing alienage classifications, then a further explanation is necessary about the viability
of Griffiths.
The recent relaxation of the usually strict standard of review
was based to some extent on the special nature of the positions
involved.18 It would have been understandable for the Court in
Foley and Norwick to hold the states to a strict accounting for
their discriminatory policy, rather than to erode a true exception
to the compelling interest test. When it seemed that the state's
chances of passing that test looked dim, there was a reversion to
the "political community" concept. It is true to say that when the
concept was introduced initially, it was not regarded as a haven
for states whose policies could not survive strict review. But the
Court's subsequent approaches to the problem of alienage discrimination have so expanded the concept that a statute's failure
to survive such strictness might not necessarily spell defeat. It
might be possible to show that the classified position affects the
community just enough to give it a governmental gloss. By these
recent pronouncements, the Court has opened the way to further
expansion of the political community." 9 As a result, a real exception to strict scrutiny may have lost some of its force.
ALIENS AND

BENEFITS

Aliens have had difficulty in other areas. In Graham v. Richardson,120 Arizona denied welfare benefits to several applicants because they were neither citizens of the United States nor fifteenyear residents of the state. The state attempted to sustain its disand aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship." Id. at 14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice later wrote the majority opinion in Foley
and quoted from his Mauclet dissent. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 295.
118. Foley involved the police function and Norwick involved public school
teaching. In the former case, a policeman by his acts could deprive citizens of
their liberty, and in the latter case, the teachings of the instructor would indoctrinate young minds. It has been observed in another context that teachers shape
"the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live." Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). See also Note, Aliens' Right to Teach- Political Socializationand the Public Schools, 85 YALE LJ. 90 (1975).
119. One commentator has suggested that "to include police officers in the category of office-holders who govern, or whose identity determines the community's
basic conception is to expand that category dramatically and unjustifiably." L.
TmE, AMERICAN CONSTITTONAL LAW

120. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

97 (Supp. 1979).

criminatory policy through its proprietary interest in disbursing
welfare benefits. In restricting its funds to the privileged citizenship class, the state completely ignored the fact that a citizen of
another state could receive aid even though such a citizen had no
greater claim to Arizona's resources than an alien. Arizona's
scheme resulted in differing treatment of citizens of another state
and citizens of another country. The former could lay claim to
welfare benefits while the latter were excluded solely on the basis
of their alienage. But both classes of people could be classified as
foreigners with respect to Arizona. This unequal treatment violated the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.
Such unequal treatment has been the failing of many statutes
affecting the rights of aliens. Such statutes have also had the effect of creating impermissible inroads into the immigration powers of the federal government. If the government alone enjoys the
right to prescribe immigration' 2' and naturalization requirements, 122 states cannot impinge on that right through discriminatory alienage classifications. This federal preemption of
immigration powers restricts a state's freedom to impose certain
limitations that would effectively nullify aliens' rights.
It may be different, however, when federal restrictions come
into play, for in the exercise of its immigration powers Congress
may impose restrictions and limitations on aliens.123 It is because
of the exclusive power granted to Congress in this area that there
is such narrow judicial review of congressional actions.124 Thus,
although the state of Arizona encountered insuperable difficulty
in meeting the constitutional challenges to its welfare scheme, the
federal government in Matthews v. Diaz125 was able to sustain its
durational residency requirement for aliens in its medical insur121. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
122. U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
123. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 & n.17 (1976). In Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Supreme Court overturned a federal civil service regulation restricting federal employment to citizens. The Court recognized that a legitimate basis for requiring citizenship for federal employment might exist but
that such a restriction could be imposed only by Congress or the President. Such
a restriction might have as its basis the President's interest in negotiating treaties
with other nations or the congressional interest in providing an incentive for
aliens to become naturalized. Id. at 104. President Ford subsequently confined
the competitive federal service to citizens by Executive Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R.
§ 7.4 (1980), which was sustained in Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979). A due process challenge recently failed in
Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 49 U.S.L.W. 2193 (9th Cir. 1980).
124. " he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization." Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81-82 (1976).
125. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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ance program. The government's conferral of welfare benefits on
citizens would not constitutionally require similar treatment for
all aliens. Further, the Court did not subject the federal statute
considered in Diaz to strict scrutiny as it did the state statute in
Graham. It is the business of the federal government to make
distinctions between aliens; that is normally of no concern to
states. It was quite reasonable, said the Court in Diaz, for Congress to prescribe a residence requirement for aliens to be eligible for medical insurance.126 As aliens showed a closer affinity to
27
the country, they would establish eligibility for the program.1
The significance of the Court's minimal scrutiny in Diaz can be
underscored by suggesting that similar treatment of aliens by a
state would have evoked strict scrutiny by the Court.128 One justification asserted for the lenient standard was that the statutory
discrimination occurred not between aliens and citizens but
rather within the class of aliens.129 This ground had been advanced previously to the Court as a pretext for state discrimination against aliens, but without success. 130 In Diaz it was
apparently different because the Court was dealing with a federal,
rather than a state, classification. But if it was true in Nyquist v.
Mauclet that the discrimination was not merely within the class
of aliens, then the same observation could be made about the situation in Diaz.131 A durational residency requirement was imposed on aliens but not on citizens; and, however one looks at it,
this feature crystallized the difference between the eligibility of
citizens and the eligibility of aliens for participation in the program.
The Court's view that Congress need not provide all aliens with
the benefits accorded to citizens did not strengthen the case for
minimal, rather than strict, scrutiny.132 Nor was Diaz converted
126. Id. at 83.
127. Id.
128. Such scrutiny has not revealed a compelling state interest in those types
of cases. However, in Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md.,1974), affd, 426
U.S. 913 (1976), the Court held that a state had a compelling interest in restricting
jury service to citizens. Aliens have also been excluded from voting. Skafte v.
Rorex, 191 Colo. 399, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed,430 U.S. 961 (1977).
129. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80.
130. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 8-9 & n.12 (1977); Matthews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 504-05 & n.11 (1976).
131. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 290.
132. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82.

on that basis into a case of discrimination within the alien class
only.133 A state is usually called to strict account for its discrimination against resident aliens, a class very much akin to citizens
in many respects. In Diaz the federal interest was sustained on a
mere reasonable interest even though the plaintiffs included
some resident aliens. Even if the Court believed that minimal
scrutiny was all that was required in dealing with the nonimmigrant plaintiffs, that rule should not have been applied to immigrant plaintiffs,134 for immigrants had been regarded previously as
"a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom
...

heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."135 Perhaps the

Court did not think it necessary to search for a distinction be3
tween the nonimmigrant plaintiffs and the immigrant plaintiffs.1 6
But in avoiding that difficulty the Court deprived the resident
aliens of the judicial deference they had come to expect, particularly in the context of state classifications.
Aliens have also encountered difficulties in obtaining state
financial assistance. Occasionally such benefits are restricted to
citizens, or to persons who have declared their intention to become citizens. One of the latest challenges in this area came in
Nyquist v. Mauclet,13 7 in which the Court declared a statute unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and could not survive the strict scrutiny test. The state argued that the statute did not discriminate
on the basis of alienage because aliens who had declared an intention to become citizens were entitled to share in its largesse.
The state thus suggested that the statute' 38 distinguished only
133. Rosberg, supra note 131, at 290-91.
134. The recent challenges to statutory classifications were all made by lawful
permanent residents and the Court applied the usual strict scrutiny. But the challenged statutes also excluded nonirmigrants. However, that did not affect the application of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., In re GriffIths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
135. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing the famous footnote
in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where the Court said
that it would invalidate any legislation that was affected by prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities." Id. at 152-53 n.4).
136. The nonimmigrants in Diaz were Cuban refugees whom the Attorney General paroled into the United States without their being subject to normal numerical limits. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1976). However, these parolees were not deemed
to be lawful permanent residents under the statute. Nevertheless, because of the
Attorney General's discretionary power, these refugees could stay indefinitely.
The Refugee Act of 1980 no longer allows the parole power to be used to admit
groups of refugees. The Attorney General must have compelling reasons to parole
an alien as a refugee rather than admit him as a refugee under the normal flow
provisions. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 107.
137. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
138. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or
(b) must have made application to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified
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within the alien class and not between citizens and aliens. That
argument had met with little success in Graham v. Richardson,
where the statute in question restricted the grant of welfare benefits to those aliens who had met the durational residency requirement. In following Graham, the Court reiterated that it was not
necessary to have an absolute ban against all aliens provided
aliens as a class were subject to discrimination.
The state offered other novel arguments to sustain the statute.
It suggested that the statute provided an incentive to aliens to become citizens and that the restriction of aid to those who were, or
who would become, voters was meant to raise the educational
standards of the electorate. 13 9 If it was important to the state to
provide an incentive to aliens to seek naturalization, that concern
should not have been reflected in discriminatory state legislation
because the federal government possesses exclusive power over
immigration and naturalization.
The justifications proffered were particularly significant because they related to the development of the political community,
a feature discussed in cases as recent as Sugarman and Foley.
But the Court could not fit the Mauclet situation within the narrow exception of Sugarman,140 which allowed the state to take
alienage into account in defining the qualifications of voters or of
"elective or important non-elective officials who participate directly in the formulation, execution or review of broad public policy." The Sugarman limitation which had proved so troublesome
in Foley was artfully used this time to put the state's objectives in
proper perspective. Although it was desirable to have an informed and educated electorate, that objective could be accomplished without subjecting the aliens in Mauclet to such
discrimination. It was easy for the Court to conclude that there
was no unfairness in permitting resident aliens to share in the
same aid programs to which they had contributed their taxes.
Chief Justice Burger seemed somewhat troubled in Mauclet
that the Court was depriving the state of an opportunity to ensure
that only those persons who had given a commitment to the state
for citizenship, must submit a statement affirming intent to apply for
United States citizenship as soon as he has the qualifications, and must
apply as soon as eligible for citizenship ....
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 661(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).

139. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 10.
140. Id. at 11 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).

would share in its financial awards.141 Unfortunately, that argument seemed to relate too closely to the state's desire to provide
an incentive for aliens to become naturalized. The Chief Justice's
suggestion that the state had a right to deny assistance to "transients" who were not willing to become citizens somewhat misstated the position of resident aliens. Such aliens cannot in any
sense be termed "transients" because they normally intend to establish a continuing and lasting relationship with their new homeland and they are admitted on that basis.142 Thus, it was an
unfortunate use of the term because it suggested that resident
aliens have no roots in the community.
The required declaration of intent to assume American citizenship did not really involve the question of the aliens' intent to remain in the state. The likelihood that such aliens would continue
to reside there was only tenuously related to their becoming citizens of the United States. If the state had rested its restrictions
on a desire to help those persons who were likely to make valuable contributions as residents of the community, the state statute
should probably have dealt with domicile rather than citizenship.
In that event, the state would have had to apply the restriction
generally to aliens and citizens alike.
The argument that the aliens were able to redeem themselves
simply by declaring their intent to become citizens did not obviate the constitutional infirmity of the statute discussed in
Mauclet. Although aliens can usually become citizens after fulfilling a prescribed residence requirement, 143 they do not cease being a "discrete and insular minority" by virtue of their ability to
assume a status which shields them from the state's discrimination. 4 4 There is something to be said for not allowing a statute to
avoid the "suspect classification" treatment simply on the basis of
141. Id. at 14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice also said that the
state should be allowed to act in any reasonable manner if a fundamental interest
is not involved. Id. If alienage is a suspect classification, then it should not matter
whether a fundamental interest is affected for strict scrutiny to apply.
142. Unless an alien falls within any of the nonimmigrant classes, he is regarded as an immigrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1976). An inunigrant who is admitted for permanent residence is regarded as interested in an indefinite, rather
than a temporary, stay. Id. § 1101(a) (20), (31) (1976).
143. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1430 (1976) for naturalization requirements.
144. Justice Rehnquist saw a distinction between the situation in Mauclet,
where the aliens could remove themselves from their disabling status by declaring
their intent to become citizens, and the situation in Griffiths, Sugarman, and Graham, where the aliens were for a time unable to do anything about their status.
He could not agree that the aliens in Mauclet were a "discrete and insular" minority. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His ultimate position would be that, unlike race or nationality, alienage is an alterable trait and
therefore would not give rise to a suspect classification. See Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the alien's ability to alter his status in this way. The reality is
that the intent to assume citizenship does not negate the discrimination against the alien. A restriction is placed upon him that is
not placed upon citizens. The apparent coercion to change one's
status does not change the basis of the discrimination.
In Griffiths, the Court found unconstitutional a Connecticut
rule because it discriminated against aliens generally; the Court
did not distinguish between aliens who had resided in the United
States less than five years and those who were eligible for citizenship because they had fulfilled the five-year residence requirement.145 Thus, the Court did not seek to restrict the suspect class
to those who were unable to remove themselves from the alienage
disability. The scrutiny should be no less searching if the discrimination is against aliens only, even if such aliens are able to
bring themselves outside the affected class by affirming their intention to become citizens as soon as possible. It is submitted
that strict scrutiny is mandated if a classification is based simply
on alienage and reaches aliens as a class even though they may
not all be subject to the restrictions imposed. Although it is true
that there is no constitutional requirement that states should dispense their financial resources to aliens, once the state makes
such awards, it should accord citizens and resident aliens similar
treatment unless there is some compelling reason that it should
be otherwise. The basic question ought to be whether the state
has a substantial interest in promulgating the classification in
question and whether that classification concerns aliens only,
even though it may not cover all aliens.
Moreover, the state's burden is in no way alleviated by a justification based on economic incentives to its citizens. That approach comes perilously close to the special public interest
doctrine which has been long discredited. Assuming that the
state's resources are not limitless, the state should nevertheless
be called upon to demonstrate the necessity of preserving them
solely for citizens of the United States and of withholding them
from resident aliens who themselves contribute to the same program. It is for these reasons, therefore, that the Court strictly
scrutinized the statute in Mauclet and found it wanting.146
145. The alien in Griffiths was eligible for citizenship, but she did not intend to
apply for it. 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.1 (1973).
146. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 9-12.

It is not unusual for aliens to miss certain benefits because a
particular state has classified all aliens as nonresidents. The situation arises more frequently when an alien student in a state university seeks the benefits of the lower tuition rate accorded to
state residents. The objectionable feature of the classification in
such cases is the irrebuttable and conclusive presumption that all
aliens are nonresidents, even though many of them may be lawfully admitted aliens who have in fact established residence in
the state.14 7 That presumption works a violation of due process
under the fourteenth amendment because the alien is denied the
opportunity to establish his status as a state resident. The presumption of nonresidency is somehow intertwined with the
state's interest in allocating its limited resources to its own citizens. But it is difficult to sustain this policy in view of Graham's
holding that a state's fiscal integrity cannot be used as a justification for invidious discrimination against aliens. Such objectionable treatment of aliens requires strict judicial scrutiny, not
because of the involvement of any basic constitutional right,148
but because of the suspect nature of the classification.149
Other considerations may come into play if a nonimmigrant
alien asserts rights to benefits. If state law does not preclude a
nonimmigrant from establishing domicile within the state, then a
denial of benefits to him would rest on some basis other than nonresidence. For example, if a state university refuses in-state tuition benefits to nonimmigrants even if they are able to establish
domicile,150 the state may predicate that refusal on a desire to
147. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The presumption of nonresidence
for aliens had previously caused mischief in Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178
(N.D. Miss. 1974), aFd, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910
(1977). The statute there had branded all aliens as nonresidents without giving

them an opportunity to rebut the presumption. The statute was sweeping because
it applied the presumption to immigrants and nonimmigrants alike. It was difficult

for the state to justify its fiscal concerns in the face of this invidious discrimination against aliens. There was no compelling interest that could support the exclusion of all aliens from resident tuition benefits.
148. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
where the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right. In
Mauclet, Chief Justice Burger said: "Where a fundamental personal interest is
not at stake-and higher education is hardly that-the State must be free to exercise its largesse in any reasonable manner." He found the strict scrutiny test inapplicable. 432 U.S. at 14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
149. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971).
150. In Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978), the nonimmigrant aliens held
visas (G-4) that were available to employees of international organizations and
their families. They were denied in-state tuition because they were not regarded
as domiciliaries of the state. The Supreme Court certified the following question
to the Maryland Court of Appeals: "Are persons residing in Maryland who hold or
are named in a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (G) (iv) (1976 ed.), or who are
financially dependent upon a person holding or named in such a visa, incapable as

[VOL. 17: 201, 1980]

Alien Meets ConstitutionalHurdles
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

equalize educational costs between those who pay state taxes and
those who do not. However, many classes of nonimmigrants do
contribute to state programs by the payment of taxes. The question remains whether this is a reasonable place to draw the line
between the beneficiaries and the nonbeneficiaries of a particular
state program.' 5 1 If a nonimmigrant has established domicile
within a state, then it would be difficult to separate him from
other state residents on the basis of cost equalization. That motive should dictate that the state deny benefits to all persons who
have not borne the cost burden. Therefore, immigrant status
would be irrelevant.
There may be other bases for distinguishing the eligibility of
immigrants and nonimmigrants for certain state benefits, such as
in-state tuition rates, which do not involve fundamental rights.
The state may have a legitimate interest in assuring that such
benefits be conferred on students who, having abandoned their
former domicile, intend to live indefinitely within the state. Most
nonimmigrants cannot legally form that intent under federal law
by virtue of their visa status. 152 The question of intent cannot be
avoided by the fact that no congressional restriction was placed
on certain nonimmigrants, such as employees of international or-

ganizations.

53

The absence of restrictions in such cases may be

explained in part by a congressional objective to facilitate the
functioning of the officials in these nonimmigrant classes, rather
than by any attempt to belittle the intent requirement. Moreover,
a matter of state law of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland?" 435 U.S. at 668-69.
The Maryland Court of Appeals answered that question in the negative in Toll v.
Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 397 A.2d 1009 (1979). The Attorney General of Maryland then
requested the Supreme Court to take up the case again. However, the Court remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of the new constitutional issues in light of the university's decision to exclude the nonimmigrants
from in-state tuition benefits regardless of their ability to become domiciliaries of
the state. Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979).
151. For example, nonimmigrant students can work with the proper permission.
Intra-company transferees, professors, and diplomats are among those who can
come to the United States to work. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (A), (L) (1976); 8
U.S.CA. § 1101(a) (15) (H), (J) (West Supp. 1980).
152. A student visa is issued only to someone who wants to enter the United
States temporarily to pursue a course of study. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (F) (1976).
153. Such employees hold "G-A" visas and are not asked whether they intend to
live permanently in the United States. Thus, these noninmigrants can determine
what they want to do about their domicile without putting their visa status in jeopardy, provided they remain employees of an international organization recognized
in the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (G) (iv) (1976). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 435
U.S. 647, 666 (1978).

even if such officials do not run afoul of federal law by harboring
an intent to remain indefinitely within the country, they are not
normally required to pay the full panoply of state taxes.154 Thus,
while they may indeed intend to become residents of the state,
they can legally avoid some of the responsibilities that would
normally flow from that alliance. The state's legitimate interests
in cost equalization would not be fulfilled, therefore, by granting
equal benefits to this nonimmigrant class. However, if the state
determines that a nonimmigrant is not precluded from establishing state residence, then its interest in cost equalization would
have to be met not by determining immigrant status, but rather
by reaching the various classes of contributors. And while there
is a very small class of nonimmigrants not subject to the usual
one way
state assessments, many nonimmigrants do contribute in 55
or another to the programs in which they want to share.1
If a state statute denies a benefit to all nonresidents, whether
they be aliens or citizens, the important criterion seems to be the
nonresidence rather than the alienage of the persons excluded.
In that case, the courts should not subject the statute to strict
scrutiny.156 The alien's assumption of permanent residence in the
United States would not automatically result in the establishment
of residence for state purposes. Once the state sets its own residence standards, it would apply to both citizens and aliens alike.
Therefore, the exclusion of nonresident aliens in this context
would have a logical relationship to the state's objective of assuring that certain benefits be dispensed to those who have chosen
to settle within its jursidiction.
There is a slight problem of overinclusiveness with respect to
the exclusion of all nonresident aliens from the category of state
residents.157 However, if a rational basis approach is taken towards the exclusion, it can be seen that the state's dependence on
154. This was one of the issues raised in Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
The university's Intercampus Review Committee denied the aliens' appeal for instate tuition in part because neither the aliens nor their parents were subject to
the "full range of Maryland taxes." Id. at 653. That view was sustained by the university's president. Id. at 653-54.
155. If a nonimmigrant alien has worked and lived in the community, he has
paid some kind of taxes. Sometimes an alien qualifies for certain benefits without
being lawfully admitted. In Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub noma. Shang v. Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978), an alien plaintiff was able to
qualify for benefits under the Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) program because the Immigration and Naturalization Service permitted her to stay indefinitely because of her citizen children. She was deemed to be in the United States
under color of law and qualified therefore under a federal regulation granting benefits to "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law.... ." 553 F.2d at 848-49.
156. See Rosberg, supra note 131, at 313.
157. Id.
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the federal categorization of nonimmigrants is supportable. Permanent resident aliens enter the United States with some expectation of staying indefinitely. The same cannot be said for
nonimmigrants. Although some of them are not required to give
any assurance of maintaining their foreign domicile, still, nonimmigrants are admitted for a specific purpose and a limited time. 5 8
Furthermore, once admitted, they do not have the same responsibilities as resident aliens. This difference has not escaped the
Supreme Court, which has emphasized in its decisions dealing
with alienage classifications that resident aliens share many of
59
the duties and responsibilities imposed on citizens.1 Thus, although nonresident aliens may be disadvantaged to some extent
by a statutory scheme that excludes them from participation in
state benefits, a court should look only for a rational basis that
supports such treatment. If the state chooses to rely on the federal benchmark that constitutes lawful permanent residence, then
that reliance should not be upset by the possibility that some
nonimmigrants may in fact reside in the state for an extended period. The state's approach to the determination of residence need
not take into account every conceivable class of nonimmigrant. If
only a rational approach is required, the existence of some unfairness in the statutory scheme should not by itself prove its uncon16
stitutionality. 0
The result should be otherwise if the statute denies benefits to
all aliens. In that case the disabling feature is alienage and the
statute would be suspect immediately. The statute would be constitutionally unacceptable because of its reliance on alienage
rather than nonresidence for a denial of the benefit. However, if
the nonresident alien is isolated because of other statutory requirements which he cannot meet, including residence, then the
statute should not fall victim to strict scrutiny.161
158. Most nonimmigrants must show that they have a residence in a foreign
country that they do not intend to abandon. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (B)
(1976) (temporary visitors for business or pleasure); Id. § 1101(a) (15) (F) (students).
159. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 722 (1973).
160. See Rosberg, supra note 131, at 313 & n.144.
161. Id. at 314. It may be different though where a statute absolutely deprives
illegal aliens of educational opportunities. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 49 U.S.L.W. 2088 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that aliens have made great strides in their
quest for equal opportunity. They have had to dispel certain legal
myths about their loyalty, competence, and disposition. Now that
the special public interest doctrine is no longer fashionable,
aliens have found it easier to counteract the other arguments that
have been made in favor of alienage restrictions.
States have had no success in preempting the federal role in
immigration. This notable lack of success should not be distressing because lawfully admitted aliens should not be subject to the
harassment of local laws that curtail their right to earn a living.
In addition, such local intervention cannot be permitted to nullify
the alien's right to travel freely around the country. That right is
infringed upon to the extent that aliens are denied access to
many benefits provided by the states.
It is also encouraging that the Court has been rather strict in
requiring not only that the governmental interest supporting discrimination be legitimate and substantial, but also that the classification designed to further that interest be necessary and
precise.162 The adherence to this requirement has produced discomfort for those who vainly espouse the relevance of the alien's
loyalty and allegiance. The loyalty question bears no substantial
relationship to the ends sought to be achieved by the classification, and a call for preservation of the American heritage has not
produced any widespread sympathy for alienage restrictions.
Thus, attention is now focused on the qualifications for a particular position. Such qualifications can normally be ensured through
testing or some other appropriate procedure. However, if the
state is involved in the classification of important nonelective positions that require the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy, the discriminatory classifications need meet only
the rational basis test. 1 63 The same may be said for the qualifica-

tions of voters, elected officials, and other positions which go to
the heart of representative government. 64
162. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964).
163. The Court said in Sugarman v. Dougall: "But our scrutiny wil not be so
demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a state's constitutional prerogatives." 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). In Foley v. Connelie, the Court used
this language: "In the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function
is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of
the particular position. A state may, therefore, consonant with the Constitution,
confine the performance of this important police responsibility to citizens of the
United States." 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (footnote omitted).
164. See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to
Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
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The difficulty lies in identifying those functions which are at the
core of representative government. Before Foley the Court
seemed destined to construe the political community concept
rather narrowly. Perhaps these earlier cases are distinguishable
because they involved the curtailment of rights that were necessary for the alien to function in the community. Thus, although
the Court conceded the right of aliens to pursue an education and
to earn a living, it restricted the righlt to govern to citizens.165 The
Court will, therefore, examine each position to determine whether
"it involves discretionary decision making, or execution of policy,
which substantially affects members of the political commu-

nity.'

66

165. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978).
166. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (footnote omitted). This test is
not particularly helpful because it is rather broad. The "political community" exception is not sufficiently precise for a proper balancing of the alien's rights and
the state's interests. See Comment, The ConstitutionalStatus of State and Federal
GovernmentalDiscriminationAgainst ResidentAliens, 16 HARV. INT'L L J. 113,125
(1975).

